On 13 April, the European Climate Foundation (ECF) launched its ‘Roadmap 2050’ report, which lays down four different scenarios for decarbonising the EU’s power sector in order to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050. “I am encouraged by the main message which comes from this analysis (...) that substantial decarbonisation of energy in Europe by 2050 is both technically and economically feasible”, said EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger, adding that the ECF report will be “of great use in preparing our infrastructure package for later this year". His reaction was echoed by Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard, who also welcomed the study.

Spanish State Secretary for Energy Pedro Marín Uribe, EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger, European Climate Foundation CEO Jules Kortenhorst, Spanish State Secretary for Climate Teresa Ribera	Commissioner Oettinger receives a copy of the 2050 Roadmap from ECF CEO Jules Kortenhorst

 

At the launch of the ‘Roadmap 2050’ report, the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC), like other environmental and energy stakeholders, was enthusiastic that “deploying renewable energy technologies is not more expensive, and even rather cheaper than conventional sources when taking all costs into account – social and environmental benefits, such as avoided fossil fuel or CO2 cost”...

The majority of commentators view the main outcome of COP15 – “The Copenhagen Accord” - as weak, partial and without clear legal status. All of these charges are justified, relative to the expectations that had been built up in advance. After all, COP15 was supposed to be the deadline agreed under the Bali Action Plan by which negotiations should have been completed on a post-2012 framework to tackle climate change.  And, with a new, more climate-friendly, President in the US –the country seen as the most important impediment to progress - the stage was seemingly set for a major breakthrough.  

However, the reality turned out differently.  The pace of the official-level negotiations over the two years under the Bali Action Plan was slow and inadequate and, despite the election of a new President, it was clear that the US could not commit to the necessary level of ambition without approval from Congress, which was bogged down in the healthcare debate.  In China and the other major developing countries there was no appetite for a new legally binding treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, largely based on fears that it would open up discussions on the relative roles and responsibilities of developed and developing countries, in particular the principle of “Common But Differentiated Responsibility”, enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol.  Together, these factors meant that it was clear, many months before COP15, that a comprehensive, effective and ambitious legally binding agreement in Copenhagen was out of reach.  

However, COP15 was not a disaster.  The main outcome, in addition to the formal extension of the mandates of the two tracks of negotiations – the “Kyoto track” and the “Convention track” – was a complementary political document – “The Copenhagen Accord”.