The majority of commentators view the main outcome of COP15 – “The Copenhagen Accord” - as weak, partial and without clear legal status. All of these charges are justified, relative to the expectations that had been built up in advance. After all, COP15 was supposed to be the deadline agreed under the Bali Action Plan by which negotiations should have been completed on a post-2012 framework to tackle climate change.  And, with a new, more climate-friendly, President in the US –the country seen as the most important impediment to progress - the stage was seemingly set for a major breakthrough.  

However, the reality turned out differently.  The pace of the official-level negotiations over the two years under the Bali Action Plan was slow and inadequate and, despite the election of a new President, it was clear that the US could not commit to the necessary level of ambition without approval from Congress, which was bogged down in the healthcare debate.  In China and the other major developing countries there was no appetite for a new legally binding treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, largely based on fears that it would open up discussions on the relative roles and responsibilities of developed and developing countries, in particular the principle of “Common But Differentiated Responsibility”, enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol.  Together, these factors meant that it was clear, many months before COP15, that a comprehensive, effective and ambitious legally binding agreement in Copenhagen was out of reach.  

However, COP15 was not a disaster.  The main outcome, in addition to the formal extension of the mandates of the two tracks of negotiations – the “Kyoto track” and the “Convention track” – was a complementary political document – “The Copenhagen Accord”.

COP15 and the Accord made some significant advances:

-    Climate at the top of the political agenda: the fact that over 110 world leaders turned up to a meeting on climate change is hugely significant; climate change is now at the top of the political agenda like never before (remember that it was as recently as 2005 that climate change was first put onto the agenda of leaders when Tony Blair made it a theme of the UK’s G8 presidency)
-    Long-term goal: support from both developed and developing countries, albeit weakly-worded, for the overall aim of limiting global average temperature rise to less than 2 degrees C
-    Commitments and Actions: for the first time, due to the pressure of the COP15 deadline, ALL major economies have committed to specific commitments and actions.  (Even a year ago, who would have thought that the US would bring to the table an economy-wide target and commit to the aim of USD 100 billion per year in assistance to developing countries? Or that China would commit to an intensity target that, depending on its economic growth, could keep Chinese emissions flat by 2020?)
-    Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV): a breakthrough on how commitments and actions will be monitored, signed up to by both developed and developing countries
-    Finance: support for USD30 billion of “fast-start” finance between now and 2012 and agreement that the developed world should aim for USD 100 billion of assistance to developing countries, per year, by 2020

These are all significant steps forward that are a direct result of COP15.  

Of course, there are also weaknesses in the Accord, in particular:

-    The absence of specific numbers for greenhouse gas emissions reductions both globally and nationally;  
-    The lack of a deadline to reach agreement that binds in both developing and developed countries to a new legal framework; and
-    The fact that the agreement was simply ‘noted’ by the COP instead of being adopted as a formal Decision.

So, was the Accord the best outcome we could have hoped for?

Given the political realities in:
i)    the US (President Obama could not commit the US to a legally-binding treaty before Congress had passed domestic climate legislation);
ii)    other developed countries (who were very reluctant to take on further commitments without the US or the major developing countries taking on comparable commitments); and
iii)    in the major developing countries (who argued that a new treaty wasn’t necessary – developed countries simply needed to implement the Kyoto Protocol), the outcome of COP15 was always going to be a compromise.  COP15 demonstrated once again that international agreements only reflect political realities, they never define them.   In that context, the agreement was about as much as could be expected.  See Annex A for analysis of key countries’ at COP15.

So, what are the prospects for 2010?  

As with 2009 there is a packed climate change agenda.  The first milestone was the 31 January deadline for countries to make known their support for the Copenhagen Accord and to submit commitments and actions for inclusion in the Accord’s annexes.  Fifty-five countries accounting for almost 80% of world greenhouse gas emissions have pledged varying goals for fighting climate change under this 31 January deadline. This gives a much clearer picture of the significance, and strength, of the Copenhagen Accord. Although the commitments that have been put in the Accord’s annexe will have to be more ambitious in the future, we can welcome the fact that all these nations submitted pledges of emissions reduction. These are clear signals of willingness to move forthcoming negotiations towards successful conclusions.

The timetable for the formal UN negotiations in 2010 is unclear beyond the annual Subsidiary Bodies meeting in Bonn (31 May to 11 June) and COP16/MOP6 in Mexico (29 November to 10 December).  However, it is very likely that there will be further meetings (inter-sessionals) to make progress on the two formal negotiating tracks – the Kyoto Protocol track and the Convention track – whose mandates were extended for 12 months at COP15These are likely to take place in Bonn, Germany (the home of the UNFCCC secretariat).  Although Denmark officially holds the UNFCCC presidency until COP16 in Mexico, there appears to be little appetite in Copenhagen to drive forward the process in 2010, so Mexico will very likely pick up the baton early. To better prepare the forthcoming international climate negotiations, the BASIC countries (China, India, Brazil and South Africa), as well as French President Nicolas Sarkozy, have proposed to organize monthly meetings between the 28 countries that negotiated the Copenhagen Accord on the final day of the conference.

Alongside these formal negotiations will be so-called “near negotiations” such as the G8, G20 and, possibly, a new iteration of the Major Economies Forum (MEF).   Canada holds the presidency of the G8 in 2010 and South Korea will be presiding over the G20.  There are back-to-back meetings of the G8 and G20 leaders planned in Canada on 25-27 June and climate change is very likely to be high on the agenda, particularly given Korea’s impressive investment in low carbon as a major part of its economic recovery, or stimulus, package.  It is unclear whether or not there will be a MEF in 2010 but my assessment is that it is unlikely – the process was never seen as legitimate by many developing countries and hence its value is limited.  However, recognizing that it is impossible to have all 192 UN countries in the room discussing the detail of all the issues, it is possible that Mexico may be tempted to convene a smaller representative group, possibly along the lines of the Copenhagen Commitment Circle set up by the Danish PM, that would include a mixture of developed, developing, the least developed and small island states.

Outside the multinational processes, there are significant developments likely in key countries.  One of the most important and closely watched issues on climate change in 2010 will be the progress of US domestic legislation, the single biggest factor in determining the ability of the President to make international commitments.  The House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES) – also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill -in June 2009 but, in order for the President to make it law, a similar bill must be passed by the Senate.  A cross-party group of Senators consisting of John Kerry (Democrat), Joe Lieberman (Independent) and Lindsay Graham (Republican) is developing a bill that, they hope, can attract the 60 votes required to pass.  This was always going to be a very tough task and, post-COP15, my assessment is that it is now even harder, for several reasons.  First, the deadline of COP15 has now passed and that was a very useful focus for action.  Second, President Obama’s flagship healthcare bill is still not resolved.  Much political capital has been used on this issue and those Members of Congress (30 Senators and all of the House of Representatives) facing mid-term elections later this year will be reluctant to take further unpopular positions on controversial issues in the run up to an election.  Sources on Capitol Hill tell me that if a climate bill isn’t passed by the end of May, it won’t happen in 2010 (and by the way, if it drifts into 2011, the Waxman-Markey Bill will be wiped from the legislative record and the House will need to vote on a climate bill again).  Third, the Democrats have just lost their filibuster-proof 60-vote majority in the Senate with the surprise victory for the Republicans in the Massachusetts special election following the death of Senator Edward Kennedy last year.  With voting on climate change largely along party lines, this is a big blow.  And finally the US, as with much of Europe, has experienced an unusually cold winter.  Anti-science groups have used this to try to convince people that global warming isn’t happening and, despite the fact that of course there is absolutely no scientific basis to the claim that a cold winter over part of the world means that global warming is not happening, there is no doubt that, both in the US and in Europe, public opinion has shifted in a way that will make strong action more difficult.  That said, the prize of ambitious US legislation would be game changing and, together with specific measures to support energy efficiency and clean technology, such legislation would unleash American innovation and generate as yet unseen scale to the international carbon and clean energy markets.  The President must make this a priority for his second year in office.

2010 will also see the launch of the 12th 5-year plan in China.  This will be a significant test of the seriousness with which China is taking climate change.  Ideally the target of a 40-45 per cent reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels by 2020, announced in the build up to COP15, will be embedded in the new plan, together with strengthened actions on energy efficiency and low carbon sources of energy.  It is notable that since Copenhagen, China has already adopted new measures requiring utilities to purchase more renewable energy.

The EU has a busy agenda in 2010 under the leadership of Spain (Jan-Jun) and Belgium (Jul-Dec).  The Spanish presidency has put sustainable economic recovery at the top of its agenda with climate change, in particular implementing the Copenhagen Accord, likely to be central. Despite strong advocacy for an ambitious commitment of at least 30% of emissions reduction from 1990 level, the EU has committed itself to a unilateral 20% target, and the 30% objective remains conditional: the EU is ready to show more ambition if other major economies do the same.

On 10 February, the European Parliament approved a resolution giving its position regarding the outcome of the Copenhagen summit: it stresses that the EU should not consider its failure of December 2009 as a reason to postpone further EU policies to achieve necessary carbon emissions reductions. According to the resolution, it must unilaterally set a CO2 reduction target greater than 20% for 2020 despite the Copenhagen summit’s outcome. The resolution even outlines that “the initiatives taken within the EU to promote and encourage the green economy, energy security and reduced energy dependency will make it increasingly easy to fulfil a 30% reduction commitment”. Indeed, recent analysis shows that with falling greenhouse gas emissions due to the recession, the EU could now meet a unilateral target of a 30% reduction by 2020 more easily.  First, the EU is almost half way there already. Latest data from the European Environment Agency indicates that in 2008 the EU’s emissions were already at 10.7% below 1990 levels and that business-as-usual would take us close to 15%.  2009 is very likely to show a further reduction.  Second, and most strikingly, recent studies have shown the drop in emissions during the recession has now lowered the costs of meeting a 30% target to at least €100bn below the initial projected costs for the 20% target.  Although the 20% target looked impressive when it was set in 2008, much has changed internationally since then. The 20% target is now lower in ambition than targets offered by the US and Japan when expressed in relation to the most recent emissions data.  Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa have all now pledged unilateral, ambitious targets. The EU can no longer claim that 20% by 2020 represents credible leadership.

Meanwhile, the international community is still pumping billions of tons of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.  The science is hardening.  2009 was the 2nd warmest year on record and, significantly, despite the cold winter in the northern hemisphere, 13 January 2010 was the warmest day globally since satellite records began, fuelled by the El Nino effect in the Pacific combined with the warming effect of man-made emissions.  The politics, although moving, are still not moving fast enough to catch up with the science.  A sluggish global economy may buy a little more time but, given that it is cumulative emissions that matter, each year becomes more important than the last and the task of reducing emissions sufficiently to avoid the largest risks of manmade climate change becomes increasingly difficult.  

It is very clear to me that, if an agreement is to be reached in Mexico, the Kyoto Protocol must form the basis of the post-2012 framework.  This is extremely important to developing countries.  And, recognizing that the US Congress is extremely unlikely ever to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the continuation of the Protocol must be complemented by formal COP Decisions that bind in the US with comparable commitments, and that formalizes the major developing country actions and MRV in order to unlock the finance from developed countries.

It will take extraordinary political leadership in all of the major economies to create the political conditions necessary to deliver an ambitious, effective and equitable legally binding agreement in Mexico in December 2010.

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Annex A – Analysis Of The Key Players At COP15

US

The US played a relatively quiet role at COP15, despite the attention that President Obama and his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, received.  Importantly the tone, rhetoric and substance has changed from 8 years of the previous Bush Administration’s stalling and the announcement of a target to cut emissions by 17 per cent cut from 2005 levels by 2020 and Hillary Clinton’s announcement at COP15 that the US supports long-term funding of USD 100 billion per year by 2020 are significant advances, even if they are not as ambitious as the international community would like.  The Obama Administration’s position was constrained by the lack of a mandate from Congress, with climate legislation currently held up in the Senate.  The Copenhagen Accord, with progress on developing country actions and monitoring, reporting and verification will go some way to alleviating US Senators’ concerns about unilateral US action, doing no harm to the prospects for domestic legislation in 2010.  However, as discussed above, other factors make a 2010 climate bill look even harder now.  Even if a bill had passed ahead of COP15, the numbers were very unlikely to be substantially different from those put on the table by President Obama.  So it is difficult to see how the US position will change much in 2010, even if legislation is passed.  The Administration will have been pleased not to have been pushed into a corner about a legally binding deal at Copenhagen and certainly influenced the Danish presidency to lower the ambition in this regard in the run up to the conference.

China

Blamed by many for the lack of progress at COP15, a charge it has strongly rebutted, China was probably one of the most satisfied with the outcome.  It avoided language about a new treaty, numbers for developing country actions and even allegedly removed the numbers for developed country emissions reductions (possibly because it knows that at some point between now and 2020 it will itself become a developed country).  China’s view on the legal form of a post-2012 agreement and its attachment to the Kyoto Protocol were well known but many experts thought China would show more flexibility in Copenhagen.  The reality is that there was not enough pressure from developed countries – the EU didn’t move to 30 per cent and the US did not bring new numbers to the table.

Unlike many other developing countries, China’s criteria for success at Copenhagen were based more on protecting red lines than extracting concessions from other Parties.

Before Copenhagen, China faced considerable pressure from developed countries to pledge deep emissions cuts compared to ‘business-as-usual’. However, in the absence of wider ambition among other countries (particularly from developed countries) China’s pre-conference commitment to a 40-45% carbon intensity target from 2005 levels by 2020 was not seriously challenged or critiqued and, depending on the growth rate of the Chinese economy over the next 10 years, may turn out to be a very challenging goal.

Other ‘successes’ for China from Copenhagen include the agreement to continue the two-track negotiation process, and the defense of its core position on the sensitive issue of monitoring, reporting and verification (i.e. ensuring differentiation in MRV for unilateral versus supported mitigation actions). However, the ambiguity of the MRV text, including language around “international consultation and analysis” of developing country actions gives room to both the US and developing countries for their own interpretations and there are potentially difficult discussions ahead to more clearly define the detail.

EU

A very weak performance by the EU.  A lack of clarity in terms of the trigger for the 30 per cent reduction by 2020 contributed to confusion and internal wrangling.  The Swedish presidency was disappointingly ineffective and there wasn’t the required bold leadership on show from the EU’s big guns.  Failure to protect language about the need for a legally binding deal in 2010, after China’s suggestion to remove it, was hard to fathom but illustrative of the EU’s ineffectiveness at COP15. The lack of a reference to the 50 per cent global reduction needed by 2050, the 25-40 per cent range of emissions cuts from 1990 levels by 2020 for developed countries and the deadline for completing a new legal agreement are all major omissions about which the EU will be disappointed.  

The fact that the core of the final text was agreed between the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, China, India and South Africa) must have hurt the EU but, in the end, they had no choice but to sign up or risk being blamed for the failure. There is a real risk that, if the EU does not make a decisive move towards a transformational low carbon economy very soon, it could find itself out in the cold and playing second fiddle to a US-BASIC deal and losing out on the opportunities in terms of green jobs and new industries.  The experience of COP15 should serve as a warning shot across the bows of the EU and it must find a new assertiveness if it is to maintain a leading role on climate change.

 

 

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